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The thesis I shall propose here is that hyperreflexivity is the
condition for mental disorders to exist. I am not saying that
hyperreflexivity is the original cause of mental disorders.
According to my thesis, these derive from certain life
problems —conflicts, difficulties, frustrations. The role of
hyperreflexivity, I argue, is to convert these life problems into
«mental disorders», that is, into sets of symptoms that have an
internal cause, imply pathological modes of experience, and
require specific treatment.
Given that I also understand hyperreflexivity as a historical-
cultural phenomenon —and not a universal psychological
process— mental disorders, on my view, would not always have
existed, nor would they exist in all cultures. Life problems have
never been lacking, of course, but without hyperreflexivity, I shall
argue, they would not become psychological problems, but rather
something else, or perhaps nothing in particular.
Once established historically, hyperreflexivity is both an
institutional and an individual psychological phenomenon. This is
related to the fact that certain institutions, such as clinical
practices, participate in the fashioning of mental disorders. In this
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Hyperreflexivity, understood as intensified self-consciousness in which subjects disengage from
normal forms of involvement with nature and society, often considering themselves as objects of focal
awareness, is proposed here as a condition of mental disorders, without which they would not exist.
This thesis is argued from a dual perspective: clinical and historical. In the clinical perspective, it is
shown that hyperreflexivity is not merely concomitant with mental disorders, but indeed has causal
priority over them. Empirical evidence of a correlational, experimental and therapeutic nature, or
deriving from cultural change, supports this claim of causal priority. In the historical perspective, it is
shown that hyperreflexivity depends on certain historical-cultural circumstances that have prevailed
since the Renaissance. These circumstances have to do with the emergence of the modern subject,
displaced, autonomous and condemned to a hapless ‘interior journey’. This means that mental
disorders as such would not have existed prior to that era. Nor in the wake of the Renaissance would
mental disorders automatically come into being, depending as they do on a reflexive, institutional
clinical context, which would not emerge until practically the nineteenth century, but which would
extend swiftly from then on.
La hiperreflexividad como condición de los trastornos mentales: una perspectiva clínica e histórica.
La hiperreflexividad, entendida como autoconciencia intensificada en la que el sujeto se desvincula de
las formas normales de implicación con la naturaleza y la sociedad tomándose a sí mismo como su pro-
pio objeto, se propone aquí como condición de los trastornos mentales, sin la cual éstos no existirían.
Esta tesis es argumentada en una doble perspectiva: clínica e histórica. En la perspectiva clínica se
muestra que la hiperreflexividad no es un mero concomitante de los trastornos mentales, sino que tie-
ne prioridad causal sobre ellos. Esta prioridad causal es sostenida por evidencia empírica de tipo co-
rrelacional, experimental, terapéutica y de cambio cultural. En la perspectiva histórica se muestra que
la hiperreflexividad depende de ciertas circunstancias histórico-culturales dadas a partir del Renaci-
miento. Estas circunstancias tienen que ver con el surgimiento del sujeto moderno, desvinculado, au-
tónomo y abocado a un desdichado ‘viaje interior’. Quiere decir que los trastornos mentales propia-
mente dichos no existirían antes de esta época. Después de ella, los trastornos mentales tampoco
existirían de forma automática, porque dependen de un contexto clínico reflexivo, institucional, que no
se empezaría a dar prácticamente hasta el siglo XIX y sería galopante en adelante.
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sense, neither would mental disorders be natural entities «out
there» waiting to be discovered, nor would clinical practices be
objective systems of discovery.
But what is hyperreflexivity? According to Louis Sass,
hyperreflexivity is an intensified form of self-consciousness in
which the subject disengages from normal forms of involvement
with nature and society, often taking itself, or its own experiences,
as its own object (Sass, 1992, p. 37). Reflexivity being one of the
loftiest conditions of the human being, hyperreflexivity emerges
as a paradoxical effect of reflexivity itself, as though greater
awareness of oneself brought with it a danger and an illness – as
Nietzsche indeed warned.
I shall begin by considering hyperreflexivity from the current
clinical perspective, and later shall consider it from a historical
perspective. 
Hyperreflexivity in psychopathology today
What I am calling hyperreflexivity is recognized within the
clinical context under several different names, such as self-
consciousness, meta-cognition, worry, rumination, self-focused
attention and, of course, hyperreflexivity (Davey & Wells, 2006;
Ingram, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007;
Sass & Parnas, 2003; Wells, 2007; Woodruff-Borden, Brothers, &
Lister, 2001 ).
I prefer the term hyperreflexivity because, while retaining a
psychological and psychopathological sense, it also has a
philosophical and cultural dimension that the other terms (such
as rumination or self-focused attention) lack, since the latter are
conceived purely in clinical terms. Thus, hyperreflexivity will
give easier access to the historical perspective to which I have
referred. In any case, however, until I actually introduce this
historical perspective, later in my lecture, I shall make use of
the more widely used terms self-focused attention and
rumination.
Self-focused attention has been defined by Rick Ingram, of
San Diego State University, as «an awareness of self-referent,
internally generated information that stands in contrast to an
awareness of externally generated information derived through
sensory receptors» (Ingram, 1990, p. 156). Self-focused attention
is not necessarily pathological. Indeed, a distinction has been
made between adaptive and maladaptive forms of self-focus
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). For example, adaptive forms of
self-focus, such as mindful self-awareness or acceptance, not
only do not exacerbate symptoms, but can actually be
therapeutic. Maladaptive or pathological self-focused attention
implies a process of self-absorption, «defined by excessive,
sustained, and rigid attention to information emanating from
internal sources» (Ingram. 1990, p. 169). Unless I indicate
otherwise, I shall be referring to self-focused attention in this
maladaptive sense of self-absorption or, to use another term,
rumination.
Self-focused attention has been linked to a wide range of
clinical problems, including depression, anxiety, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, social phobia, panic attacks, anorexia,
bulimia, substance abuse and schizophrenia (Davey & Wells,
2006; Ingram, 1990; Mor & Winquist, 2002; Woodruff-Borden,
Brothers, & Lister, 2001). Given the manifest ubiquity of this
process, it is difficult to find any mental disorder that does not
involve increased self-focused attention.
The question is whether self-focused attention is a mere
companion that follows the appearance of the disorder, or whether it
is actually a condition for the emergence of the disorder, as I shall try
to argue. In principle, the former possibility would appear to be the
most viable one, since in the presence of a disorder it is logical for it
to monopolize our attention and preoccupation. We are depressed,
and this leads us to focus on how we are, what we feel, what we
think. However, the second option —undoubtedly paradoxical— is
more interesting, since it opens up the possibility that self-focused
attention might actually be a condition for the development of the
disorder. We ruminate on how we are, what we feel, what we think,
and this leads us to end up suffering from depression. Although the
most plausible solution might be to acknowledge without further ado
a reciprocal process between disorder and self-focused attention,
such a process would be difficult to conceive without involving
some causal priority. According to my thesis, this causal priority
would lie with self-focused attention.
Such causal priority of self-focused attention is supported by
empirical evidence of various types: correlational, experimental,
therapeutic and cultural.
Correlational studies show that the self-focused attentional
style is a vulnerability factor for negative affect. Thus, for
example, students at Stanford University with more ruminative
styles had longer and more severe periods of depression after the
San Francisco earthquake of 1989 than those with more
distracting, mastery-oriented response styles. By coincidence,
Susan Nolen-Hoeksema and Jannay Morrow, leading authors in
this research field working at Stanford, had measured among other
variables the ruminative style of more than 200 students just ten
days before the earthquake, and took advantage of this natural
disaster to test the hypothesis that the ruminative style predicts
depression and post-traumatic stress, which was indeed found to
be the case (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).
Experimental studies show that the induction of self-focused
attention has adverse emotional, cognitive and behavioural effects.
Experimental induction usually involves instructing some
participants to focus on themselves and others to focus outside of
themselves. 
Thus, a study by Sonja Lyubomirsky and colleagues, also at
Stanford University, compared two conditions, one of rumination
and the other of distraction. The rumination condition required
participants to concentrate their attention on thoughts that were
emotion-focused, symptom-focused, and self-focused, though
participants were not told specifically to think about negative
emotions or negative personal attributes. For example, they were
asked to think about «your current level of energy», «the physical
sensations in your body», «what your feelings might mean», «your
character and who you strive to be», and «why things turn out the
way they do». In contrast, participants randomly assigned to the
distraction condition concentrated their attention on thoughts that
were focused externally and not related to symptoms, emotions, or
the self. For example, they were asked to think about «a boat
slowly crossing the Atlantic,», «the expression on the face of the
Mona Lisa,» and «a truckload of watermelons». The results
showed that those in the rumination condition, compared to those
in the distraction condition, experienced more depressed mood,
had more persistent thoughts, and blamed themselves more for
their problems, and that they perceived their problems as more
overwhelming and difficult to resolve than they actually were
(Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999).
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Given that self-focused attention can be ruminative,
maladaptive, or non-ruminative, adaptive, these conditions have
also been experimentally induced. The maladaptive condition was
defined as a form of analytic self-focus, consisting in analyzing
and evaluating certain experiences (e.g., «Why did you feel this
way?»). In turn, the adaptive condition was defined as a form of
experiential self-focus, consisting in focusing on the experience of
the moment (e.g., «How did you feel moment-by-moment?»).
Participants, depressed patients, who had been instructed to focus
in an experiential way on the symptoms, significantly reduced
pathological memory (associated with poorer clinical course), but
this was not the case for those who had been instructed to use an
analytic focus, who dwelt on negative memories, according to
studies by two researchers in Britain, Ed Watkins of Exeter
University and John Teasdale at Cambridge (Watkins & Teasdale,
2004).
Therapeutic evidence shows that the reorientation of patients
outside of themselves opens up a path to solution of their problem.
This route is suggested by the studies cited above, in which
distraction rather than rumination, and the experiential form of
self-focused attention rather than the analytic form, are found to be
adaptive. In any case, classical psychological therapies
—including Existential Therapy, Strategic Therapy and Gestalt
Therapy— had already brought this solution into play, prior to and
independently of such studies. 
But it is probably the latest generation of behavioural therapies
that best represent this reorientation of patients or clients
outwards, away from themselves, rescuing them from their self-
reflexive circuit. I am referring in particular to Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy, developed by Steve Hayes and colleagues
at the University of Reno (Hayes, 2004), and Behavioral
Activation, developed by Neil Jacobson and colleagues at
Washington University (Dimidjian, Hollon, Dobson et al., 2006).
Both begin by showing that the key to the different psychological
disorders is a kind of pernicious relationship between oneself and
one’s own private events —anxiety, fear, sadness, intrusive
thoughts, voices, etc.— which prevents us from getting on with
life —solving the pressing problem, changing the situation,
seizing new opportunities, clarifying and applying values, and so
on. 
In this regard, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy
proposes the acceptance of such events and at the same time the
commitment to act in the direction of values. The acceptance
involved is an experiential type, similar to mindfulness. For its
part, Behavioral Activation highlights the fact that the
activation of behaviours aimed at contact with environmental
contingencies is more effective for coming out of a depression
than analysis focused on cognitions —automatic thoughts,
attributions, schemas, etc.— as practised by cognitive therapy.
These and other therapies succeed in showing that the
reorientation of patients outside of themselves is therapeutically
more effective than attempts at suppressing or analyzing private
events. 
Cultural changes also show that self-focused attention mediates
the influences of culture on psychological symptoms. This can be
observed, for example, when people from Asian cultures emigrate
to Western countries. As is well known, Asian people pay more
attention to interpersonal and somatic aspects of the self, while
Westerners are more concerned with introspective aspects, such as
thoughts, feelings, or the self itself, so to speak.
It has been seen how Asian emigrants —Chinese and
Japanese— to the USA come to pay increasingly more attention to
aspects of the self, and less to somatic aspects. The changes in the
focus of self-attention would appear to explain the changes in the
experience of depression, which includes more affective and fewer
somatic symptoms as the level of Western acculturation increases,
according to a study by Hongtu Chen and colleagues at Harvard
Medical School (Chen, Guarnaccia, & Chung, 2003).
Although it has yet to be demonstrated, it can be predicted that
the experience of depression in Asian countries will take on a
progressively more introspective dimension the more influence
they receive from Western culture. According to the Western
model of depression, it can be estimated that there are currently of
the order of 100 million Chinese who are depressed without
knowing it. But know it they shall, as soon as the sensitization
campaigns mounted by pharmaceutical companies start shaping
their experience of everyday nerves, as has occurred in the West
over the last 20 years. The implication is that the experience of
mental disorders is to a significant extent mediated by cultural
influences, observable even within the space of a few years. In any
case, my interest here is in a much longer historical perspective.
In this historical viewpoint, the clinical perspective to which I
have referred would be nothing more than the present-day
manifestation of a phenomenon that needs to be analyzed with
regard to its sources and the conditions that make it possible. With
a view to taking on this historical perspective, I shall return to the
term hyperreflexivity.
Hypereflexivity in modernistic literature
This hyperreflexivity or intensified self-consciousness was
already observed, well before today’s clinical psychologists, by
the authors of literary works in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries throughout Europe, from St. Petersburg to Lisbon, from
Prague to Paris. It suffices to recall a few authors and some of their
hyperreflexive characters.
In St. Petersburg we find Fyodor Dostoevsky. Dostoevsky,
speaking through the unnamed character in his 1864 work Notes
from the Underground, says: «I swear, gentlemen, that to be too
conscious is an illness —a real thorough-going illness. For man’s
everyday needs, it would have been quite enough to have the
ordinary human consciousness, that is, half or a quarter of the
amount which falls to the lot of a cultivated man of our unhappy
nineteenth century […] It would have been quite enough, for
instance, to have the consciousness by which all so-called direct
persons and men of action live.» This hyperconsciousness derives
from reflection on the causes of one’s own behaviour, questioning
what the normal person, l’homme de la nature et la verité, would
take for granted, adjusted to nature and to the truth. The hapless
thinking man, with his extreme sensitivity, piles up around
himself, in the form of doubts and questions, a great accumulation
of wretchedness and gloom. 
Prague provides us with the example of Franz Kafka. Kafka
himself appears as a creature of the subsoil, with his
hypersensitivity, extreme self-consciousness and continual self-
scrutiny. Although practically all his works offer personal proof of
this problem, we shall recall only Investigations of a Dog, from
1922, a story whose dog-narrator acts as Kafka’s alter ego. The
dog is a kind of philosopher who, through his compulsive habit of
pondering and asking about the canine condition, ends up living a
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marginal and, in his own words, «solitary and withdrawn»
existence.
In Paris we find Charles Baudelaire. Baudelaire both described
and contributed to inventing the sensitivity of modern life. As he
says, the life of large cities needs a new language: «a poetic prose,
musical without rhythm and without rhyme, malleable enough to
adapt to the lyrical movements of the soul, to the undulations of
dreams, to the sudden starts of consciousness.» Baudelaire writes
this in the preface to Le Spleen de Paris: Petits Poémes en Prose,
from 1864. Spleen is precisely the new sensitivity that Baudelaire
cultivated. As you will recall, spleen is a complex emotion, made
up of nostalgia, melancholy, disappointment, bitterness, tedium,
boredom and irony. This modern experience is for Baudelaire not
a mere passive sensitivity, but an authentic form of life and of
experiencing the city. 
From Lisbon comes Fernando Pessoa. Pessoa is another
unfortunate consciousness of modern life. He gave expression to
his particular Lisbonese spleen in his Book of Disquiet, a poetic
diary, of prose poems written between 1913 and 1935. Pessoa’s
disquiet is marked by tedium, affliction, the anguish of living, in
sum, by the malady of life. The malady of life is for Pessoa the
illness of being conscious. «Life’s basic malady, that of being
conscious, comes into my body and discomfits me». Pessoa’s
strategy for dealing with the malady of life is the creation of
heteronyms. «To create another Self that takes on our suffering,
that suffers what we are suffering. Next we need to create an inner
sadism, completely masochistic, that enjoys its suffering as if it
were someone else’s». We are talking here about a somewhat
schizoid strategy, as protection against others and distancing from
oneself, projecting oneself into another. Although Pessoa’s highly
literary self-reflexivity indeed contributes to the malady of life —
with its poetic creation and its masochistic recreation— it also
holds a cure.
These references highlight the fact that intensified self-
consciousness characterizes the experience of modern life. I am
referring here to an experience in which people disengage from
normal forms —spontaneous, ingenuous, simple— of relating to
the world and society, taking themselves, or their experience, as
the object of reflection. This modern experience can take various
forms, from more sophisticated and poetic ones to other, more
common and prosaic ones. Among the sophisticated and poetic
forms would be the aesthetic reflexivity and ironic distancing of
the cited authors, especially Baudelaire and Pessoa. Among the
common and prosaic forms would be the ‘nerves’ of everyday life
—anxiety, depression— and alienation —and I would include
schizophrenia here. These common and prosaic forms of
experience probably give rise to a large part of neuroses and
psychoses, whose clinical forms, indeed, were defined in this same
modern era —you will recall Kraepelin and Bleuler, not forgetting,
of course, Freud.
In any case, the prosaic form of the disorder is not without its
own poetry, not only when patients write their stories, as many do,
but also when clinicians do so, in accordance with their practices
—descriptions, interviews, diagnoses, explanations, protocols,
and so on. Clinical literature, however clinical, is literature all the
same. Just as the literature of writers both expresses the modern
experience and contributes to experiencing it —for example,
Baudelaire’s spleen became a general sensitivity— clinical
literature both describes and prescribes what happens to patients
—for example, the current propagation of depression.
Given the role of clinical literature in the shaping of the
experience of mental disorders, we should be talking here about
institutional reflexivity, but we must continue in our quest for the
sources of this modern reflexivity. If before today’s clinical
psychologists came the modernist figures of literature, even before
them were the modern philosophers, beginning with Descartes,
through Locke and Rousseau, and ending up with Kant.
Hyperreflexivity in modern philosophy
Descartes is considered the founder of the modern subject, by
virtue of his famous «I think, therefore I am», in his Discourse on
Method of 1637. The important point here is that Descartes takes
self-awareness as the basis on which to build philosophy, and
hence knowledge and the very existence of the world. If
Descartes’ contribution is to place the subject at the centre of
modern philosophy, then «Descartes’ error» is to conceive that
subject as an immaterial substance separated from the world and
from its own body. But this «error» would become established as
the «official doctrine» of the modern mind, a mind supposedly
self-founded and locked into itself. As Sass argues, «The essential
implications of Cartesianism for the modern self might be
summed up in two words: disengagement and reflexivity».
For his part, it was Locke who introduced the term «personal
identity», in 1694, in the second edition of his work An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding. The question for Locke was
to understand the stability and durability of the self in spite of its
divisions and discontinuities. He proposed consciousness as the
condition of personal identity. The self itself —says Locke—
exists insofar as its consciousness can be extended backwards to
any action in the past. Being the same consciousness is what
«makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on
that only». The self-consciousness on which identity is based is
the consciousness not of a thinking substance (as in Descartes) but
rather a corporeal and socially articulated one. Locke’s
consciousness is not so much a matter of knowledge as a matter of
responsibility and self-control. 
Rousseau, in his Confessions, completed in 1770, lends support
to the interiority of the modern self. As he says, what is proposed
is to reveal interiority, to expose «a man as he is inside». Rousseau
finds the source of authenticity for this revelation in the self itself.
Nature would be the ultimate source of authenticity. Feeling,
rather than thought, would be the starting point. I feel, therefore I
exist, could be Rousseau’s motto. Indeed, in his own words: «I felt
before I thought; that is the common fate of mankind». The inner,
natural person described by Rousseau is self-sufficient, creator of
itself. In this sense, the modern Rousseauist self, which feels and
creates its own existence, would appear to be the heir to attributes
previously assigned to God. 
Finally, Kant established the trilogy of the modern subject:
thought, will and feeling, as though to unite Descartes, Locke and
Rousseau. On the basis of these ‘faculties’, Kant developed,
respectively, his three Critiques: Critique of Pure Reason (1781),
Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and Critique of Judgement
(1790). Each one of these ‘critiques’ represents an aspect of the
subject: transcendental subject, practical-moral subject and
aesthetic-sentimental subject. The point is that each of these
subjects presents a sort of duality of ambivalence between the
sovereignty of the consciousness and its alienation. Thus, the
transcendental subject is at once a knowing subject and a primary
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object of knowing. The practical-moral subject is conscious of
being free and at the same time shackled to the world’s causal
order. The aesthetic-sentimental subject is able to rise up to the
universal feeling of beauty and at the same time feel terrified by
the feeling of the sublime. The modern subject is, then, a «strange
empirico-transcendental doublet», in the celebrated words of
Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1966/1979). The cultural and clinical
implications of this strange doublet have been and continue to be
developed by Sass, showing that the contradictions generated by
hyper-self-consciousness and alienation are central to both modern
mind and schizophrenia (Sass, 1992; 1994; 1998).
Although these philosophers and others are the founders of the
modern reflexive self, they are not actually its sources. So, we
must continue in our pursuit of the sources of modern reflexivity.
These sources are found in certain changes that took place
precisely at the beginning of the so-called Modern Era.
Sources of modern reflexivity
The Modern Era is generally situated in the European
Renaissance, in the 15th century, even though it has earlier roots
and does not progress at the same pace in all places. What is
important to stress here is that this is the era in which the modern
reflexive self has its origins. Subjectivity and individualism take
on a new dimension consisting in an increasing self-consciousness
about the fashioning of human identity. More particularly, the new
sense of the self views the human being as agent, subject, or author
—as someone responsible for his or her actions and assertions.
This at that time new form of individual can be understood in
relation to the role of prudence and sincerity in the social life of
that era, as argued by John Martin of Trinity University in Texas
(Martin, 1997).
Prudence ceased to be the ancient virtue it was —related to
practical reason—and became a strategy of social relations,
consisting in the art of concealing one’s intentions and feelings in
interactions with others. In turn, sincerity became the ideal of
harmony between the heart and the tongue. Although there may be
some, Renaissance courtiers, for example, who adopted prudence
more than sincerity —subordinating honesty to decorum—, and
others, such Protestant reformers, who adopted sincerity more
than prudence —subordinating in this case decorum to honesty—
, the majority of people probably lived somewhere between the
two postures, as suggested by Polonio’s advice in Hamlet.
Polonius not only reminds Laertes to be «true» to himself, but also
to «give thy thoughts no tongue» (Hamlet, I, 3, 59). 
The point is that the interplay of prudence and sincerity gives
rise to the ‘interior man’, as distinct from the ‘exterior man’. As
the German sociologist Norbert Elias put it, in this era there rises
up an invisible wall between the ‘interior world’ and the ‘external
world’, but also between one individual and another and between
the ‘self’ and the ‘universe’ (Elias, 1939/1990). There is a new
configuration of consciousness, a new configuration that implies a
change in the civilizing process together with changes in
anthropological conceptions, that is, in conceptions of the nature
of the human being. Without such changes it would be difficult to
understand the foundation of the modern self on the part of the
philosophers I have cited.
The anthropological change involves man’s disengagement
from the surrounding structures in which he was enmeshed. Thus,
communion based on a similarity between man and God gives way
to an autonomy based now on dissimilarity. From now on, there
would be no greater truth than that based on one’s own feelings, as
Rousseau would confess. Likewise, the tightly-knit network of
people’s lives, with its congregations, its guilds, its
neighbourhoods and its traditions, gives way to an urban life
characterized by more freedom and autonomy. It is this era that
sees the emergence of the bourgeois, authoritatively studied by the
German sociologist Werner Sombart (Sombart, 1913/1999). The
bourgeois is a new figure characterized by reflexive prudence both
in business and in social relations, keeping safely tucked away
one’s private life and the «interior world» itself.
In turn, the change in the civilization process, brilliantly
analyzed by Elias, involves a comprehensive civilizing of manners
and personality, including forms of eating and of habitation,
hygiene and the containment of emotions (Elias, 1939/2000). All
such everyday mores tend to increase personal space and
awareness of an «interior world» separate from the exterior, from
others and from the universe. Contributing to this same tendency
were other practices that began to emerge at this time, such as
biographies and autobiographies, portraits and self-portraits, the
use of mirrors and, in sum, a whole science of ‘seeing oneself’,
which we might even refer to as «autopsy». 
If disengagement brings autonomy and the development of
modern society, consciousness of an «interior world» brings the
hyperreflexive undermining of individuals. The situation in which
modern individuals find themselves is magnificently described in
John Milton’s great poem Paradise Lost, of 1667. It suffices to
recall its last two words: «solitary way». This is the future of the
modern Adam and Eve. Although we knew from the poem itself
that there remained for them the discovery of the «paradise
within», today we know that it was not exactly a paradise.
Unhappy consciousness, as Hegel (1807/1977) would say, fear of
freedom, in the words of Erich Fromm (1965), homeless mind, in
those of Peter Berger (1973), and indeed, paradoxes of self-
reflexivity, according to Sass (1992): these made up much of what
the voyage into the interior would have in store.
Two important questions arise
Having arrived at the Renaissance, where we assume the
sources of modern self-reflexivity to be, two important questions
arise. The first, pursuing the historical path backwards, concerns
whether the individual in ancient times was not also reflexive.
After all, the Greeks were told to «know thyself». And the other
question, coming back to the present, would be: why did mental
disorders —at least as we know them today— not appear until
practically the nineteenth century, if self-reflexivity began in the
fifteenth?
Let us look first of all at the question of reflexivity in the
ancient world. To being with, the Delphic motto «know thyself»
does not have the introspective sense of turning inwards on
oneself, but rather the objective one of recognizing oneself as
mortal, as distinct from the gods. In any case, the advice most
widely heeded by the ancient moralists was «take care of
yourself», according to Foucault (2001/2005). This care refers to
the soul or psychê, but has more to do with discipline and virtue
than with reflection in the first person. At most, it would involve
an ordinary reflexivity, but not a radical reflexivity, following
Charles Taylor’s distinction (Taylor, 1988). Radical reflexivity
would denote turning in on oneself in the perspective of the first
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person —a turn to the self as a self—, which was not the case of
the ancient reflexivity, nor could it have been. The Greek psychê
was not a separate entity as the modern self would be —an object
for itself—, but rather an entity linked to a whole of which it
formed part —including the polis and the cosmos. (As we have
already mentioned, this disengagement would not occur until the
Renaissance.) The Greek psychê was more a suprapersonal entity
than a strictly personal one, «the soul in me and not my soul», to
use the words of the French historian of ancient Greece Jean-
Pierre Vernant (1991).
In relation to this, it is interesting to consider the proliferation
of practical philosophies with a marked therapeutic accent in the
post-classical Hellenistic era. As Epicurus would say: «Empty is
that philosopher’s argument by which no human suffering is
therapeutically alleviated». It was undoubtedly a period of crisis
and anxiety, in which the sense of belonging to the polis had
crumbled and the world had become a more uncertain place.
People were probably more sensitive and reflexive, and hence the
need for practical philosophies —just as people today need
psychotherapy. On this view, the Hellenistic psyche could be seen
as closer to the modern self than was the classical psychê. This
may indeed be the case, but it is pertinent to point out that the
Hellenistic period would be a «modern era» —with respect to the
classical one— in which the previous all-encompassing structures
had to some extent collapsed. Even so, Hellenistic reflexivity was
more focused on «the fragility of goodness» than on the psyche
itself (Nussbaum, 1986).
We might also consider St. Augustine, the indubitable
antecedent of both Descartes and Rousseau. Although the
Augustinian formula «if I am mistaken, I am» (in De Civitate Dei,
book XI, 26) is strongly echoed in the Cartesian «I think, therefore,
I am», it does not have the same implications. The Augustine cogito
is not part of a project —as is that of Descartes— to found all
knowledge on internal knowledge. For Augustine, what we know
through our senses and through the testimony of others and of
ourselves does not need foundation on internal knowledge. The
Augustinian slogan is more directed against the ancient sceptics
than erected as the foundation of knowledge (Matthews, 1992). For
their part, The Confessions of Augustine are echoed in those of
Rousseau, but they are not the same. While Augustine’s interior
leads to the superior (God), that of Rousseau leads to nature as an
inexhaustible source within oneself. The Augustine self is
centrifugal —situated outside the world— while that of Rousseau
is centripetal —emanating from inside (Hartle, 1983).
Now let us turn to the question of why mental disorders did not
appear until practically the end of the nineteenth century if, as we
have seen, self-reflexivity emerged in the fifteenth. The truth is
that «mental disorders» did exist previously, though their
reflexivity was not under the clinical sign, but rather under, as it
were, the sign of Saturn (Wittkower & Wittkower, 1963). As you
will recall, Saturn was the planet of melancholy, in which the
melancholics of the Renaissance took refuge. Thus, melancholy,
however much suffering it caused, far from being a «mental
disorder» —as would be depression today— was more than
anything else an attitude of life and a personal style —
contemplative, meditative, solitary, creative… As Michelangelo,
one of the afflicted, would claim, «My joy is melancholy» (see
Wittkower & Wittkower, 1963). The epidemic of melancholy that
apparently spread throughout Europe in the 17th century
continued under the sign of Saturn, particularly as a literary form.
As Robert Burton says in his great work Anatomy of Melancholy,
from 1621, «I writ of melancholy, by being busy to avoid
melancholy». Melancholy would still be glorified in Romanticism,
where Keats would even dedicate an Ode to it. Later would come
the spleen of Baudelaire – a state of mind conceived in more
negative terms, but not without a certain aura of specialness.
Finally, the poetic experience of melancholy would become the
prosaic experience of depression.
The point is that reflexivity under any sign whatsoever
becomes decisive in the shaping of subjective experience and of
one’s actions and reactions with regard to life, including one’s own
experiences. Thus, reflexivity under the sign of Saturn renders
melancholy an aesthetic —poetic— emotion, and under the
clinical sign turns it into a pathological —prosaic— emotion,
which is what comes to constitute depression. What I am saying is
that reflexivity begins in the Renaissance but that it only takes on
psychological–psychiatric form in the 19th century, (Brady &
Haapala, 2003; Misbach & Stam, 2006).
In terms of what concerns us here, this clinical reflexivity
begins to become organized in an institutional way over the course
of the 19th century, with the emergence of the human sciences,
among them psychiatry and psychology. Indeed, it is during this
period that there begin to take shape the «mental disorders» —
including schizophrenia (Barrett, 1996). I am not suggesting that
psychiatry and psychology create people’s problems. What I am
saying is that these clinical disciplines end up shaping those
problems as «mental disorders» —a set of symptoms, with
supposed internal cause, and so on. The «shaping» to which I refer
is not only the shaping of diagnostic conceptions, but also of the
«illnesses» themselves, which are formed not only by diagnostic
and quasi-diagnostic forms of self-awareness but by the myriad
manifestations of self-consciousness throughout modern or
postmodern culture and society. 
This influence of the clinical in the shaping of phenomena
occurs not only, then, in the context of clinical activity, but is in
fact underpinned by a whole quotidian culture that moulds
people’s experience and provides psychiatric and psychological
idioms for relating to it. Indeed, our current culture could be
characterized as a clinical culture. Thus, people have learned to
understand a large part of everyday problems in clinical terms —
depression, trauma, phobia— (Pérez-Álvarez & García-Montes,
2007). This use of scientific and technical knowledge and
information for reinterpreting everyday life is what has been
identified as institutional reflexivity by the British sociologist
Anthony Giddens (1991). Hence, everyday experiences are
continually reviewed and reinterpreted according to the tendencies
of the day, in this case, psychopathologizing tendencies. And it is
clear to see how institutional reflexivity undermines common
sense, creating problems at the same time as it solves others. 
Therefore, the answer to the question as to why mental
disorders do not appear until the end of the 19th century would be
found in institutional reflexivity —including the clinical culture it
entails. Proof of the crucial importance of institutional reflexivity
in the configuration of mental disorders would be provided by the
very hyperreflexivity —self-focused attention, rumination,
worry— that characterizes people in today’s society and that is
probably at the root of the growing psychological malaise or ill-
being —depression and the like—, which is otherwise difficult to
understand given the supposed society of welfare or well-being in
which we live. Further proof of the importance of institutional
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reflexivity —and of clinical culture— could emerge from the
discovery of depression in China, if more than 100 million
Chinese take their turn at self-focused attention, rumination, and
so on, as people have in the West.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported in part by Research Grant MEC-05-
SEJ2005-00455.
HYPERREFLEXIVITY AS A CONDITION OF MENTAL DISORDER: A CLINICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 187
References
Barrett, R. (1996). The psychiatric team and the social definition of
schizophrenia. An anthropological study of person and illness.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Berger, P., Berger, B., & Kellner, H. (1973). The homeless mind.
Modernization and consciousness. New York: Vintage Books.
Brady, E., & Haapala, A. (2003). Melancholy as an aesthetic emotion.
Contemporary Aesthetics, 1, http://www.contemaesthetics.org/pages/
article.php?articleID=214.
Chen, H., Guarnaccia, P.J., & Chung, H. (2003). Self-attention as a
mediator of cultural influences on depression. International Journal of
Social Psychiatry, 49, 192-203.
Davey, G.C.L., & Wells, A. (eds.) (2006). Worry and its psychological
disorders: Theory, Assessment ant treatment. New York: Wiley.
Dimidjian, S., Hollon, S.D., Dobson, K.S., et al. (2006). Randomized trial
of behaviorial activation, cognitive therapy and antidepressant medica-
tion in the acute treatment of adult. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, 74(4), 658-670.
Elias, N. (1939/1990). La sociedad de los individuos [Society of
individuals]. Barcelona: Península.
Elias, N. (1939/2000). The civilizing process. Sociogenetic and psycho-
genetic investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
Foucault, M. (1966/1970). The order of things. New York: Vintage Books.
Foucault, M. (2001/2005). La hermenéutica del sujeto. Curso del Collège
de France (1982) [Hermeneutics of the subject. Lectures at the College
de France (1982)] Madrid: Akal.
Fromm, E. (1965). Escape from freedom. New York: Henry Holt.
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity. Self and society in the
late modern age. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Hartle, A. (1983). The modern self in Rousseau’s ‘Confessions’. A reply to
St. Augustine. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Hayes, S.C. (2004). Acceptance and commitment therapy, relational frame
theory and third wave of behavioral and cognitive therapies. Behavior
Therapy, 35, 639-665.
Hegel, W. (1807/1977). Phenomenology of spirit. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Ingram, R.E. (1990). Self-focus attention in clinical disorders: Review and
a conceptual model. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 156-172.
Lyubomirsky, S., Tucker, K.L., Caldwell, N.D., & Berg, K. (1999). Why
ruminators are poor problem solvers: Clues from the phenomenology
of dysphoric rumination. Journal of Personality and Social Psycholo-
gy, 77, 1041-1060.
Martin, J. (1997). Inventing sincerity, refashioning prudence: The discovery
of the individual in Renaissance Europe. American Historical Review,
102, 1309-1342.
Matthews, G.B. (1992). Thought’s ego in Augustine and Descartes. Itha-
ca: Cornell University Press.
Misbach, J., & Stam, H.J. (2006). Medicalizing melancholia: Exploring
profiles of psychiatric professionalization. Journal of the History of the
Behavioral Sciences, 42, 41-59.
Mor, N., & Winquist, J. (2002). Self-focus attention and negative affect: A
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 638-662.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1991). A prospective study of de-
pression and posttraumacic stress symptoms after a natural disaster:
The 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 61, 115-121.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Stice, E., Wade, E., & Bohon, C. (2007). Reciprocal
relations between rumination and bulimic, substance abuse and de-
pressive symptoms in female adolescents. Journal of Abnormal Psy-
chology, 116, 198-207.
Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Luck and ethics in Greek
tragedy and philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pérez-Álvarez, M., & García-Montes, J.M. (2007). The Charcot effect:
The invention of mental illnesses. Journal of Constructivist Psycholo-
gy, 20, 309-336.
Sass, L. (1992). Madness and modernism. Insanity in the light of modern
art, literature and thought. New York. Basic Books.
Sass, L. (1994). Civilized madness: schizophrenia, self-consciousness and
the modern mind. History of Human Sciences, 7, 83-120.
Sass, L. (1998). Schizophrenia, self-consciousness and the modern mind.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5, 543-565.
Sass, L., & Parnas, J. (2003). Schizophrenia, consciousness and the self.
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29, 427-444.
Sombart, W. (1913/1999). El burgués [The burgeois]. Madrid: Alianza
Editorial.
Taylor, C. (1988). The moral topography of the self. In S.B. Messer, L.A.
Sass and R.L. Woolfolk (Eds.): Hermeneutics and psychological theo-
ry. Interpretative perspectives on personality, psychotherapy and psy-
chopathology (pp. 298-320). New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Vernant, J.P. (1991). The individual within the city-state. In F.I. Zeitlin
(Ed.): Mortals and immortals: Collected essays (pp. 318-334). Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J.D. (2004). Adaptive and maladaptive self-focus
in depression. Journal of Affective Disorders, 82, 1-8.
Wells, A. (2007). Cognition about cognition: Metacognitive therapy and
change in generalized anxiety disorder and social phobia. Cognitive
and Behavioral Practice, 14, 18-25.
Wittkower, R., & Wittkower, M. (1963). Born under Saturn. The charac-
ter and conduct of artists: A documented history from Antiquity to the
French Revolution. London: Weidenfeld.
Woodruff-Borden, J., Brothers, A.J., & Lister, S.C. (2001). Self-focus at-
tention: Commonalities across psychopathologies and predictors. Be-
havioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 29, 169-178.
